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1. The Call for a Budgetary Theory 
The appeal of Valdimer Key for a budgetary theory marks the interest in public budgeting in 
modern history. He clearly referred to a normative theory, raising the question: ‘on what 
basis shall it be decided to allocate X dollars to activity A instead of activity B?’ [Key, in Hyde 
& Shafritz 1978, p. 20]. A couple of efforts to develop such a theory failed before Aaron 
Wildavsky took over the relay baton, issuing the first edition of his seminal The Politics of the 
Budgetary Process that changed the budgetary landscape almost completely2. He argued 
that the allocation of scarce resources is not a matter of arithmetics or calculation, but a 
matter of power. On top of that he claimed that of incrementalism offered both the best 
description of and prescription to the budget process, introducing now common words as 
the ‘base’ and ‘fair share’ in the vocabulary of budget watchers [Wildavsky 1964]3. Soon, 
incrementalism became the dominant theory of public budgeting in America and, strange 
enough, also in Europe where the power of the purse is with the executive rather than the 
legislative branch of government. Moreover, empirical support was at least mixed, if not to 
say weak [LeLoup 1978; Rubin 1988]. 
The incremental nature of the budget is further challenged in the period of economic 
decline in the 80s due to the oil crises. It turned out that decrementalism is not simply the 
mirror image of incrementalism since the base is under attack [Schick 1983, p. 23]. The 
various interest groups and stakeholders will fight the spending cuts, giving the budget 
process a highly political profile. The traditional way of budgeting - across-the-board-cuts4 - 
did not provide much relief requiring more targeted spending cuts. Consequently, micro-
budgeting was counterbalanced by macro-budgeting [LeLoup 1988], setting norms for the 
reduction of the budget deficit and/or public expenditures, changing the rules of the game 
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and, noteworthy, the relative strengths of the players of the game5. The advocates suddenly 
faced strong guardians, playing down the upward pressure on the budget. The success and 
failure of these budgetary reforms and their predecessors like the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System [PPBS] and Zero-Base Budgeting [ZBB] has got much more attention than 
the design of a grounded theory. Unfortunately, we have to conclude that our insight in the 
process of public budgeting and cut-back management is still anecdotal and fragmented, 
though we know a lot more than Valdimer Key when he ventilated his call for a budgetary 
theory. 
 
2. The Battle on the Balanced Budget 
The attempt to balance the budget is still relatively young though James Savage has argued 
that balance is deeply rooted in the American history [Savage 1988]. In the mid 80s the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings [GRH]-amendment [1985], creating the sequestration procedure, 
prepared the ground for a reduction of the budget deficit. The impact may have been 
modest, but it is quite clear that the more effective spending caps of the Budget 
Enforcement Act [BEA] would not have passed without the GRH-amendment. The 
movement became only serious when the budget became an issue in the mid-term elections 
during the first Clinton administration [1994]. The constitutional amendment as promoted 
by the Noble Price winner James Buchanan may have failed, but both parties reached a 
statutory arrangement to balance the budget. 
A few years later the European countries followed suit when the heads of state and 
government came to terms about a target for the budget deficit and a procedure for the 
reduction of excessive budget deficits at the Maastricht summit [1991]. The reference value 
for the budget deficit, which is one of the standards for the qualification for the Economic 
and Monetary Union [EMU]6, was first set at 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product [GDP] and 
later at the Amsterdam summit [1997] further reinforced to a ‘budgetary position close to 
balance or in surplus’7. In addition, the budgetary policy of the European member states is 
going to be directed by the ‘principle of prudent fiscal policy making’, introducing numerical 
rules that basically curb government expenditures in order to avoid that windfalls on the 
revenue side are spent instead of being used for debt reduction. All efforts are geared to 
fiscal consolidation in order to avoid debt accumulation [OECD 2010a]. 
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3. Budgetary Reform 
The process of budgetary reform has been driven for some time by the New Public 
Management [NPM] movement inducing, inter alia, a revival of performance budgeting. 
Taking the traditional line-item budget as point of reference Christopher Pollitt and Geert 
Bouckaert discern a trajectory of budgetary reform that is completed by the adoption of 
accrual budgeting [Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 69-70]. Only a few OECD-countries have gone 
through the full cycle as the constraints of both the strict and broad interpretation of 
performance budgeting [Schick 2003: 101] have become clear. The scope of is basically 
limited to homogeneous outputs which are rare in the public sector, the link between inputs 
and outputs, respectively outcomes is rather weak and there is not much empirical support 
for the impact of performance information on – either allocative or technical – efficiency 
Van Nispen & Posseth 2009]. The NPM movement might be over the hill [Dunleavy 2005; 
OECD 2010b], but what is new at the horizon beyond performance budgeting? 
The financial crisis and notably the situation in Greece mark a crossroad in the field of 
budgetary reform. On the one hand, the financial crisis is providing a window for change – to 
quote Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel: ‘you never want a serious crisis to go to 
waste … [it] is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before’ [Seib 
2008] – as illustrated by the creation of a so-called European Semester that allows the 
European institutions to assess the draft budget and to come up with recommendations 
before it is submitted to national parliaments. In addition, the European Commission has 
issued the so-called ‘six pack’ of proposals for reinforcement of European governance [Van 
Nispen 2011]. On the other hand, the room for budgetary innovation is small as the financial 
crisis is absorbing almost entire intellectual creativity and physical capacity for budgetary 
reform and, not to say, to overcome the resistance of the spending departments. The jury is 
still out. The time will learn the outcome of the trade-off between reform drivers and reform 
capacity. 
 
4. The organization of the Section 
The first chapter by Mark Hallerberg is about the changing role of institutions, more 
precisely rules to deal with the principal agent problem, moral hazard and common pool 
resources, using empirical data collected for a report commissioned by the Dutch minister of 
Finance about the European member states. He concludes that the selection and the 
effectiveness of institutions may be affected by the characteristics of the political system. 
The second paper by Rita Hilton & Phil Joyce takes a historical angle, looking at the 
current revival of performance budgeting or rather performance-informed budgeting. A 
survey of the OECD shows that a lot is going on in the field, but that might be only lip service. 
The authors identify five critical factors, notably that participants must have incentives to 
use performance information. 
  
4 
The final chapter is about the latest trend in budgeting that has to do with accrual 
budgeting. It has its roots in accounting and control rather than in budgeting. The ins and 
outs are discussed by Leonard Kok, leaning on evidence of a survey of the OECD recording a 
growing interest. However, one may question the utility since only a small portion of the 
budget is applicable for accrual budgeting. 
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